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During the Survey period, there were important decisions issued in
professional liability actions of all types. In the medical negligence con-
text, the Texas Supreme Court continued to weigh in on what constitutes
a “health care liability claim,” and addressed issues related to asserting
the medical peer review privilege. In the legal malpractice realm, Texas
courts addressed what is required to prove causation and analyzed cir-
cumstances under which a corporate shareholder may have standing to
sue the corporation’s outside attorney. During the Survey period, Texas
courts also addressed several important issues related to director and of-
ficer liability, including Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction over foreign
business entities, fiduciary relationships in closely held companies and
partnerships, personal liability of corporate officers and directors, and a
plaintiff’s standing to pursue derivative claims for a representative of a
limited partner.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. WHAT EXACTLY IS A “HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIM”?—
TEXAS COURTS CONTINUE TO WEIGH IN
The Texas Medical Liability Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code Chapter 74 (Chapter 74), requires plaintiffs asserting a “health care
liability claim” (HCLC) to file an expert report within 120 days after each
defendant’s original answer or risk dismissal of the case with prejudice.1
It is therefore crucial for plaintiffs to recognize when their case qualifies
as an HCLC under Chapter 74 and requires a preliminary expert report.
The Texas courts continued to define the applicability of Chapter 74
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1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2015).
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throughout the last Survey period, with the Texas Supreme Court weigh-
ing in to say an autopsy may be a HCLC that requires an expert report.
1. Is an Autopsy Considered “Health Care”? The Texas Supreme
Court Says Yes
The Texas Supreme Court reversed a judgment against Christus Health
Gulf Coast (Christus), holding that the plaintiff’s claim for fraud in con-
nection with the deceased patient’s autopsy was a “health care liability
claim” under Chapter 74 and was, therefore, subject to a two-year statute
of limitations.2 The plaintiff, Linda Carswell, brought suit against Chris-
tus, claiming the hospital committed malpractice in the treatment of her
husband, Jerry, who died while being treated at a Christus facility in
Houston.3 Nearly three years after her husband’s death and a year and a
half after originally filing the lawsuit, Carswell amended her petition to
include claims against Christus and its employees for conduct that took
place post-mortem.4 Carswell alleged, among other things, that Christus
fraudulently obtained her consent to a private autopsy at a related facility
in order to cover up the alleged malpractice.5 Carswell did not submit any
further expert reports related to the post-mortem conduct or her newly-
added claims.6
Christus moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the post-
mortem claims were HCLCs under Chapter 74 and were barred by the
two-year statute of limitations.7 After the trial court denied the motion,
the case proceeded to trial.8 The jury cleared Christus on the malpractice
charges, but awarded damages to Carswell on the claim that Christus im-
properly obtained her consent to a private autopsy.9 The First Houston
Court of Appeals affirmed.10
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and rendered judgment in favor
of Christus.11 The supreme court first looked to Chapter 74’s definition of
“professional or administrative services,” which are defined as “those du-
ties or services that a physician or health care provider is required to
provide as a condition of maintaining the physician’s or health care pro-
vider’s license, accreditation status, or certification to participate in state
or federal health care programs.”12 Because Christus’s license could be
revoked for failure to comply with its duties related to post-mortem care,
the supreme court held Carswell’s post-mortem claims were for “profes-
2. Christus Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 541–42 (Tex. 2016).
3. Id. at 531–32.
4. Id. at 532.
5. Id. at 534–35.
6. Id. at 532.
7. Id. at 533.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 530.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 542.
12. Id. at 534 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(24) (West
2015)).
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sional or administrative services.”13
That did not end the analysis, however, because to be considered an
HCLC, the services must have had a direct relationship to health care.14
The supreme court examined the language of the Act and determined
that the claims were directly related to health care because Carswell’s
fraud claim alleged Christus’s post-mortem conduct was for the purpose
of covering up the insufficient health care provided to Jerry prior to his
death.15 The supreme court distinguished the opinions from lower courts
holding that post-mortem claims were not health care liability claims be-
cause, in those cases, the plaintiffs were not alleging that the defendants’
post-mortem activities were carried out for the purpose of concealing de-
ficient health care prior to the patients’ deaths.16 The supreme court also
held that, to be “directly related to health care,” the alleged injury does
not have to be to a “patient” and need not occur “during or contempora-
neously with health care.”17
Because the claims were health care liability claims, they were subject
to Chapter 74’s two-year statute of limitations.18 The supreme court re-
jected the argument that Carswell’s Third Amended Petition related back
to her Original Petition.19 New claims will relate back unless they are
“wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occur-
rence.”20 The supreme court analyzed Carswell’s claims and determined
that the facts underlying the post-mortem claims were based on separate
and distinct transactions or occurrences than the facts underlying the mal-
practice claims.21 As such, Carswell did not timely file her post-mortem
fraud claim and the supreme court reversed and rendered judgment for
Christus.22
2. Slip and Fall Slip Up—The Saga Continues
In the last Survey publication, we reported on three slip and fall cases
in which the Texas Supreme Court and an appellate court concluded a
slip and fall was not an HCLC subject to the expert report and other
requirements of Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 74 just because
the accident occurred in a medical facility. However, in Phillips v. Jones,
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that slipping off the step of an examin-
ing room table is considered an HCLC that requires the plaintiff to serve
a preliminary expert report.23
13. Id. at 535.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 536.
16. Id. at 536–37.
17. Id. at 535.
18. Id. at 537.
19. Id. at 539.
20. Id. at 537 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.068 (West 2015)).
21. Id. at 538.
22. Id. at 539, 541–42.
23. Phillips v. Jones, No. 05-15-00005-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 162, at *8 (Tex.
App.— Dallas Jan. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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Plaintiff Velda Phillips sued Dr. Ryan Jones for injuries she sustained
after she slipped off the step of the examination table once her medical
exam was finished and Dr. Jones had left the room.24 The plaintiff framed
her case as a premises liability claim and did not serve the Chapter 74
expert report required for HCLCs.25 She argued her claim was not sub-
ject to Chapter 74 because it was not based on medical care provided by
Dr. Jones and was not “based upon any departure from accepted stan-
dards of medical care directly related to healthcare,” as required under
the definitions in Chapter 74.26 The court of appeals disagreed, stating
that the critical issue is whether the claim invokes the duties the defen-
dant owes as a health care provider, which include its obligation to ensure
patient safety.27 The court of appeals looked to the seven factors articu-
lated by the Texas Supreme Court in Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospi-
tal, and explained that the examination room where the fall occurred is
not an area accessible to the public.28 The court of appeals noted that
“[t]he physician uses the examination room to examine patients who have
sought the physician’s medical services,” and the examination table is “an
instrumentality” important to the medical services the physician provides
in the examination room.29
The court of appeals distinguished recent cases, including the ones re-
ported on in our last Survey publication, in which the accidents took
place in hospital elevators, parking lots, and lobbies, and were held not to
have a “substantive nexus” with the delivery of health care.30 Because
plaintiff’s claims were HCLCs, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims since she failed to timely tender an
expert report as required under Chapter 74.31
B. MEDICAL PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
Texas law has several privileges that apply in the healthcare context.
One of these privileges, codified in Section 160.007 of the Texas Occupa-
tions Code, makes medical peer review proceedings and records confi-
dential in order to promote candid and open communications regarding a
physician’s competency and improve the standard of medical care pro-
vided to patients.32 During the last Survey period, Texas courts addressed
the applicability of the medical peer review privilege and the procedure
for asserting and proving the privilege.
24. Id. at *1.
25. Id. at *1–2.
26. Id. at *2–3.
27. Id. at *4.
28. d. at *4–6 (citing Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 505 (Tex.
2015)).
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id. at *7–8.
31. Id. at *8.
32. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(a) (West 2012).
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1. Proving the Applicability of Privilege—Courts Must Examine
Documents In Camera
The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief to Christus Santa
Rosa Health System (Christus) in In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys-
tem on the applicability of the medical peer review committee privilege
and ordered the trial court to perform an in camera inspection to deter-
mine whether an exception to the privilege applied.33 The supreme court
held the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Christus to pro-
duce records without first adequately reviewing the documents in
camera.34
Plaintiff Leslie Baird filed a lawsuit against Dr. Franklin and Christus
after a thyroid surgery performed by Dr. Franklin was unsuccessful and a
second surgery was necessary.35 After the first surgery was unsuccessful,
Christus’s medical peer review committee reviewed Dr. Franklin’s con-
duct and concluded that no disciplinary or other action was required.36 In
the course of discovery in Baird’s lawsuit, Dr. Franklin sought documents
from the hospital’s medical peer review file, but Christus served its objec-
tions and asserted the medical peer review privilege.37 Dr. Franklin then
moved to compel Christus to produce the documents, so Christus submit-
ted its privilege log and the documents for an in camera inspection by the
trial court.38
The supreme court laid out the procedure for establishing and chal-
lenging privilege.39 The party claiming the privilege must first establish a
prima facie case for privilege through testimony or an affidavit.40 Once
the prima facie case for privilege is established, the party asserting the
privilege submits the documents to the trial court for inspection of the
documents.41 Then, the party requesting production has the burden to
prove the application of an exception to the privilege.42
In this case, Christus and Dr. Franklin did not dispute that the medical
peer review committee privilege applied to the records sought, but dis-
agreed about whether disclosure was required under the exception to that
privilege under Section 160.007(d).43 Section 160.007(d) requires that a
written copy of the committee’s recommendation, final decision, and rea-
son for the decision be disclosed to the physician if the committee “takes
action that could result in censure, suspension, restriction, limitation, rev-







39. Id. at 279–80.
40. Id. at 279.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 279–80.
43. Id. at 281.
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ocation, or denial” of the physician’s privileges at the hospital.44 The su-
preme court clarified the exception and held that, for the exception to
apply, the peer review committee has to do more than merely convene to
review the physician’s actions—they must take some action that could
have resulted in discipline.45 Otherwise, the “take action” language in
Section 160.007(d) would be rendered meaningless because disclosure
would be required each time the committee conducted a peer review, re-
gardless of the result, which would undermine the very purpose of the
medical peer review committee privilege—confidentiality to encourage
open discussion of a physician’s competency.46
Based on the record before it, the supreme court could not determine
whether any action by Christus’s medical peer review committee might
have resulted in some sort of discipline against Dr. Franklin.47 The trial
court abused its discretion when it failed to review the documents submit-
ted for in camera inspection, which was integral to determining whether
the documents were protected by the medical peer review privilege.48 As
a result, the supreme court vacated the order for Christus to produce the
documents and directed the trial court to conduct an in camera review of
the documents and the evidence to determine if the exception in Section
160.007(d) applied.49
2. Medical Peer Review Privilege is Not Easily Waived
The Dallas Court of Appeals also weighed in on the medical peer re-
view privilege during the last Survey period to emphasize the strength of
the privilege.50 Rockwall Regional Hospital is a physician-owned hospi-
tal.51 When Dr. Ciarochi, a shareholder who was also an anesthesiologist
at the hospital, terminated his practice at Rockwall Regional, the hospital
sought to redeem his ownership shares.52 Dr. Ciarochi sued, claiming an-
other recently-departed physician had been offered better compensation
for his shares.53
In discovery, Dr. Ciarochi requested documents that encompassed the
peer review and credentialing files for both himself and the other re-
cently-departed physician.54 Rockwall Regional resisted, asserting the
medical peer review committee privilege under Texas Occupations Code
Section 160.007(a).55 The medical peer review privilege covers a peer re-
44. Id. (citing TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(d) (West 2012)).
45. Id. at 282–83.
46. Id. at 283–84.
47. Id. at 285.
48. Id. at 286.
49. Id. at 287.
50. See In re Rockwall Reg’l Hosp., LLC, No. 05-15-01554-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS
2177 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 2, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
51. Id. at *2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *2–3.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id.
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view committee’s credentialing and review of physicians, including confi-
dential documents created by the committee or prepared at its direction,
its recommendations and minutes, and committee inquiries about a physi-
cian and responses to those inquiries.56 The trial court reviewed in cam-
era the documents in question and ordered the hospital to produce
almost all of the documents it claimed were privileged.57 The hospital
turned over four pages of the contested documents, but sought manda-
mus relief with respect to production of the remaining documents, sub-
mitting a sealed record with the disputed documents for review by the
court of appeals.58
The court of appeals reviewed the “sealed record” of contested docu-
ments and declared them all to be covered by the medical peer review
committee privilege.59 Dr. Ciarochi, however, argued that the hospital
had waived the privilege by allowing him to view, but not copy, his own
credentialing file (part of the disputed documents), pursuant to a letter
from Rockwall Regional’s attorney, and by producing four pages of the
other doctor’s file.60 The court of appeals rejected these arguments.61 Just
as the trial court had concluded, the hospital agreed the four pages from
the other physician’s peer review and credentialing file were not covered
by the medical peer review privilege.62 Therefore, the production of those
four pages could not constitute waiver as to other documents that were
privileged.63 More significantly, the court of appeals held that allowing
the plaintiff-doctor to view his own file, even though authorized in writ-
ing by the hospital’s attorney, did not waive the privilege.64 Section
160.007(e) only allows for a waiver of the privilege if the waiver is “exe-
cuted in writing . . . by the chair, vice chair, or secretary of the affected
medical peer review committee[,]” which was not shown here.65 Al-
though the hospital’s voluntary disclosure of the doctor’s records likely
would have waived other privileges such as the attorney-client or work
product privileges, it did not meet the strict requirements set forth in the
statute for waiver of the medical peer review committee privilege.66
III. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. CAUSATION IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Texas courts have constantly wrangled with the necessary proof of cau-
sation required in legal malpractice claims. During this Survey period, a
56. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(a) (West 2015).
57. In re Rockwall Reg’l Hosp., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2177, at *4.
58. Id. at *4–5.
59. Id. at *9–10.
60. Id. at *3, *10–12.
61. Id. at *10–13.
62. Id. at *13.
63. Id.
64. Id. at *10–11.
65. Id. at *10 (quoting TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 160.007(e) (West 2015)).
66. Id. at *11–12.
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number of cases were decided where courts weighed in on this issue.
While these cases reiterate that basic causation standards applicable in all
cases still guide the analysis in legal malpractice claims, courts have high-
lighted that causation analysis is important in ensuring that lawyers are
held responsible only for the harm they actually cause, not harm caused
by judicial error or speculative harm. The cases discussed below reinforce
that parties bringing claims against their lawyers should carefully analyze
their causation theory and ensure that they have non-speculative evi-
dence to fully support that theory if they hope to prevail.
1. Chain of Causation in a Legal Malpractice Claim May Be Broken
by Judicial Error
During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court was confronted
with the question of whether the causal chain is broken when a lawyer
makes a strategic error, but a subsequent error by the trial judge requires
a costly appeal.67 The supreme court analyzed this issue by looking at
well-settled principles of causation and held that judicial error, to which
the lawyer did not contribute, breaks the causal chain.68 In such a situa-
tion, the lawyer cannot be held liable under a legal malpractice theory for
the costs of an appeal to correct that error.69
This case stems from a usury case filed by Buck Glove Company
(Buck) against Jon and Barbara Neubaum (the Neubaums).70 The
Neubaums’ answer asserted the affirmative defenses of “usury cure and
bona fide error,” but those were not pursued at trial as the Neubaums’
counsel focused on Buck’s case in chief, arguing that the Neubaums’ al-
leged agent who actually made the loans in question was not, in fact, act-
ing as the Neubaums’ agent.71 Before trial, the Neubaums’ counsel
argued there was no evidence to support an agency claim and objected to
a jury instruction on actual or apparent authority.72 This objection was
overruled and the jury found against the Neubaums on the usury claim.73
After the Neubaums’ trial counsel moved for a new trial or reformation
of the judgment, which was denied, the “Neubaums hired new counsel to
appeal the adverse usury judgment.”74 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the essential ele-
ment of agency to support the jury’s verdict in the trial court.75
After winning their appeal, the Neubaums filed a malpractice suit
against their trial counsel, claiming negligent representation led to the
necessity of their appeal and the costs incurred therewith.76 Specifically,
67. Stanfield v. Neubaum, 494 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tex. 2016).
68. Id. at 104.
69. Id.




74. Id. at 94–95.
75. Id. at 95.
76. Id.
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the Neubaums claimed their trial counsel was negligent by not presenting
evidence to support the affirmative defenses of usury cure and bona fide
error and failing to request a jury instruction regarding these defenses,
and that if their trial counsel had taken these actions, the trial court’s
erroneous ruling on agency would have been mooted and the Neubaums
would have avoided the cost of the subsequent appeal.77 In response, the
Neubaums’ trial counsel moved for summary judgment, arguing that their
trial strategy focusing on Buck’s case in chief was conclusively proven to
be correct by the court of appeals’ ruling regarding agency and that, ab-
sent the trial court’s error, no appeal would have been required.78 The
trial court granted counsel’s motion for summary judgment in the mal-
practice case.79 The Neubaums appealed, and the court of appeals re-
versed and remanded as to the claim of negligent representation.80
The court of appeals’ ruling on the claim of negligent representation
was then appealed to the supreme court, where the key issue was
“whether judicial error constitutes a superseding cause of the Neubaums’
injuries in the absence of evidence the Attorneys contributed to the er-
ror.”81 Focusing on traditional proximate cause principles, the supreme
court honed in on the fact that, in certain circumstances, a “new and inde-
pendent cause” can disrupt the causal link between the plaintiff’s injury
and the defendant’s negligence.82
First and foremost among the factors that must be considered in deter-
mining whether a new and independent cause has broken the causal con-
nection is the reasonable foreseeability of the new and independent
cause.83 After noting that the fact that a judge might err is always foresee-
able as a theoretical matter, the supreme court explained that “it is not
typically foreseeable on what issues a judge will err [or not].”84 When
looking at judicial error, the inquiry should focus on “whether the trial
court’s error is a reasonably foreseeable result of the attorney’s negli-
gence in light of all existing circumstances.”85
In this instance, the appeal and the costs thereof were undeniably the
result of the trial court’s erroneous rulings on agency.86 When the
Neubaums’ trial counsel made their strategic decisions, they were
“neither negligent nor incorrect” in arguing the agency issues.87 Had the
trial court ruled correctly on that legal issue, regardless of any other stra-




80. Id. at 95–96.
81. Id. at 96.
82. See id. at 97–98.
83. Id. at 98.
84. Id. at 99–100.
85. Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted).
86. See id. at 102–04.
87. Id. at 103.
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need for an appeal.88
While it was previously unclear, with this ruling, the supreme court has
definitively stated that an attorney’s error or negligence may be causally
superseded by judicial error. Attorneys are not required to guarantee an
“error-free trial” and should only be liable for injury that they cause.89
When judicial error occurs and an attorney did not contribute to or cause
the error, the attorney is not to be held responsible to the client as a
result thereof. This should cause legal malpractice plaintiffs to pause
before filing and ensure that their attorney, and not an adverse judicial
error, caused the damages of which they complain.
2. Causation Theory in Support of Legal Malpractice Claim Cannot
Depend on Speculation Regarding How Third Parties Would
Have Reacted Under Hypothetical Circumstances
Also during the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals heard an
appeal from a take-nothing judgment in favor of Baker Botts, L.L.P.
(Baker Botts), who was sued by its former patent client, Axcess Interna-
tional, Inc. (Axcess).90 The appeal presented the question of whether
Axcess’s expert testimony on causation was legally sufficient.91
Axcess sued its former patent counsel, Baker Botts, alleging Baker
Botts was representing Axcess’s primary competitor in patenting technol-
ogy arguably similar to Axcess’s active-radio-frequency identification
(RFID) technology for which Baker Botts was prosecuting Axcess’s pat-
ent applications.92 Axcess alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and failure to disclose material information.93 In sup-
port of its claims, Axcess hired an expert to provide causation testimony
who testified: (1) Axcess would have hired other counsel had they known
Baker Botts was working for Axcess’s competitor; and (2) absent being
represented by conflicted counsel, Axcess could have taken action to file
an interference proceeding with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and amended its existing patent applications.94 In addi-
tion, the expert testified that if such actions had been taken, Axcess
would have been better positioned to negotiate with its competitor, and
the parties would have reached a business solution.95
On appeal, Baker Botts challenged Axcess’s claims on a number of
grounds, but the court of appeals’ opinion focused on Baker Botts’s at-
tack on Axcess’s proof of causation—specifically the sufficiency of the
88. Id. at 103–04.
89. Id. at 104.
90. Axcess Int’l, Inc. v. Baker Botts, L.L.P., No. 05-14-01151-CV, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3081, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 24, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id. at *1–8.
93. Id. at *8.
94. Id. at *12–13.
95. Id. at *13.
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expert testimony.96 The court of appeals confronted the expert’s testi-
mony and found it to be rank speculation based primarily on how third
parties (the USPTO and Axcess’s competitor) would have behaved in hy-
pothetical situations.97 The court of appeals further highlighted that, be-
yond the expert’s speculative testimony, Axcess had not presented any
evidence of the success of similar interference claims in the USPTO or
evidence to support how a competitor would have responded under dif-
ferent circumstances.98 In light of this, the causation testimony was held
legally insufficient and the court of appeals affirmed the take-nothing
judgment.99
The court of appeals emphasized that proof of causation cannot be
merely theoretical or speculative—actual proof is required.100 While mal-
practice claims often involve claims that, absent the negligence or breach
of fiduciary duty by an attorney, a plaintiff would have taken different
actions leading to different results, plaintiffs must give actual evidence of
that. Suggestions or theories, even by an expert, do not prove how third
parties would behave in hypothetical situations.101 If plaintiffs want to
argue about what could have been, the court of appeals made sure that
plaintiffs know that they must be prepared to provide non-speculative
evidence that what could have been actually would have been the case
absent the alleged negligence or breach of fiduciary duty by the
attorney.102
B. SHAREHOLDER MAY HAVE INDIVIDUAL STANDING TO BRING
MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST COMPANY’S LAWYERS
Lawyers often do their best to define who their client is. Lawyers regu-
larly make a point to delineate when they represent a company as op-
posed to its employees or shareholders. The Texas Supreme Court was
recently presented with the question of whether “an individual benefici-
ary of a self-directed retirement account managed by a corporate trus-
tee[ ] had standing to sue [attorneys] for legal malpractice based on
advice [given to him] regarding a loan from the retirement account to a
third party” of which he was a shareholder the attorneys represented.103
In holding that the individual shareholder had standing to sue, the su-
preme court reminds every lawyer to be cautious who they are actually
advising and the potential ramifications of such advice.
Chris Linegar (Linegar) was an Australian businessman. He owned a
limited liability company that, through a number of divisions and merg-
ers, became a part of IdentiPHI, Inc. (IdentiPHI), in which he was a ma-
96. Id. at *2, *11–18.
97. See id. at *13–14, *16–21.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *21.
100. Id. at *12.
101. See id. at *13–14.
102. See id.
103. Linegar v. DLA Piper LLP, 495 S.W.3d 276, 277 (Tex. 2016).
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jor stockholder.104 DLA Piper was IdentiPHI’s corporate counsel.
Linegar caused Zaychan PTY, Ltd. (Zaychan), the corporate trustee of
his and his wife’s Australian self-managed retirement trust, to lend $1.67
million to IdentiPHI.105 As IdentiPHI’s corporate counsel, DLA Piper
advised IdentiPHI in the loan transaction and also worked with Linegar
directly.106 To complete the loan transaction, IdentiPHI signed a promis-
sory note that granted Zaychan a security interest in all assets of Iden-
tiPHI.107 The note was due on June 29, 2008—which was important to
ensure compliance with Australian law governing self-managed retire-
ment accounts.108
At some point it became clear that IdentiPHI would default on the
loan.109 Linegar then found out that Zaychan’s security interest was not
perfected.110 Linegar, in an attempt to remain in compliance with Austra-
lian law governing self-managed retirement accounts, mortgaged his
home and used the proceeds to return the balance of the loan to his re-
tirement account.111 A few months later, IdentiPHI filed for bank-
ruptcy.112 In bankruptcy, the note yielded only $150,000 of the loan.113
Linegar sued DLA Piper.114 Linegar alleged that he was advised indi-
vidually with regard to the loan and that that advice included an assur-
ance that the security interest would be perfected.115 The jury found in
favor of Linegar and awarded damages of $1,293,606.00.116 DLA Piper
appealed, raising a number of issues, but after finding that Linegar lacked
standing, the Eastland Court of Appeals declined to address any of the
other issues.117 The court of appeals premised its no-standing holding on
the fact that Zachyan, not Linegar, held the note, that Linegar’s use of
personal funds to restore the balance of the trust did not give him stand-
ing, and that Linegar did not have standing as a beneficiary of the
trust.118 This ruling was then appealed to the supreme court.
The supreme court reviewed existing case law on standing and noted
while the general rule is that “a corporate stockholder cannot recover
damages personally for a wrong done solely to the corporation, even
though he may be injured by that wrong,” a stockholder may nonetheless









112. Id. at 278.
113. Id.
114. Id. While other entities sued as well, only Linegar’s individual claims were ulti-
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to the stockholder.119 Linegar claimed that DLA Piper improperly ad-
vised him in his individual capacity, not in his capacity as a shareholder or
a trustee, and a jury found in his favor.120 Despite DLA Piper’s argu-
ments that corporation-shareholder standing and trustee-beneficiary
standing rules must apply in this case, the supreme court noted that Line-
gar pleaded this as an individual claim and it was tried and submitted to
the jury as an individual claim.121 In light of this and the fact that, given
the circumstances, any loss would have fallen on Linegar, the supreme
court had no problem reversing the court of appeals decision on standing
and remanding for consideration of other issues not reached.122
While the facts of Linegar are unique and the relationships between
Linegar, his trust, and IdentiPHI may seem convoluted and to have com-
plicated the case, the supreme court’s ruling highlights the potential for
liability of lawyers to shareholders of a company the lawyers represent. It
is always of utmost importance for lawyers to define who the client is, not
only in an engagement letter, but also throughout communications with
shareholders and other individuals. Linegar also provides a warning to
lawyers to avoid making statements that would lead a shareholder to be-
lieve, and ultimately a jury to conclude, that the lawyer has advised that
shareholder individually when that is beyond the scope of the lawyer’s
engagement. It is important to remember that the mere fact that the com-
pany engaged the lawyer will not shield the lawyer from suits by individ-
ual shareholders with whom the lawyer interacts in all circumstances and
all transactions.
IV. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
During the Survey period, Texas courts addressed several issues, in-
cluding Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction over foreign business entities,
fiduciary relationships in closely held companies and partnerships, indi-
vidual director and officer liability pursuant to two different statutes, and
a plaintiff’s standing to pursue derivative claims for a representative of a
limited partner. Of particular import were two decisions from the Texas
Supreme Court articulating in what situations a Texas court may or may
not have personal jurisdiction over a foreign business entity, and two
courts of appeals decisions narrowly interpreting statutes that permit per-
sonal liability on corporate officers and directors.
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT ISSUES TWO OPINIONS ON
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN BUSINESS ENTITIES
On June 17, 2016, the Texas Supreme Court issued two opinions ad-
dressing the issue of Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction over foreign busi-
ness entities and their directors and officers. In Searcy v. Parex Resources,
119. Id. at 279 (quoting Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1990)).
120. Id. at 281–82.
121. Id. at 279–82.
122. See id. at 281–82.
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Inc., the supreme court held that a Texas court did not have personal
jurisdiction, general or specific, over a Canadian corporation (Parex Re-
sources) that purchased the shares of a Bermudian company (Ramshorn),
which owned assets in Colombia, from another Bermudian company
(Nabors).123 Nabors had operations in Texas and previously entered into
a share purchase agreement with a Texas limited liability company
(ERG) for the Ramshorn shares.124 When the deal between Nabors and
ERG failed, Nabors contracted with Parex Resources, the Canadian cor-
poration, for the sale of Ramshorn.125 ERG later sued Parex Resources,
amongst other parties, in Texas state court for tortious interference.126
Parex Resources filed a special appearance, and the trial court concluded
that it had personal jurisdiction over Parex Resources.127 The court of
appeals, however, reversed, concluding that the trial court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Parex Resources, and ERG appealed to the
supreme court.128
The supreme court began by reviewing Texas law on personal jurisdic-
tion. Texas courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:
“(1) the Texas long arm statute [grants] jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise
of jurisdiction [comports] with federal and state constitutional guarantees
of due process.”129 The exercise of jurisdiction by a Texas court comports
with due process guarantees if the defendant has minimum contacts with
Texas and if the assertion of personal jurisdiction does not “offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”130 “[S]ufficient mini-
mum contacts exist when the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”131 General personal
jurisdiction exists where the defendant’s contacts within Texas “are so
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home” in Texas.132
In contrast, specific personal jurisdiction “exists when the plaintiff’s
claims ‘arise out of’ or are ‘related to’ the defendant’s contact with the
forum” state.133
In Searcy, the supreme court easily concluded that the trial court did
not have general personal jurisdiction over the Canadian corporation be-
cause Parex Resources did not have any “bank accounts, offices, prop-
erty, employees, or agents in Texas.”134 The more difficult question was
123. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc. 496 S.W.3d 58, 62–63, 79 (Tex. 2016).
124. Id. at 63.
125. Id. at 64–65.
126. Id. at 65.
127. Id. at 65–66.
128. Id. at 66.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
131. Id. at 67 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
132. Id. at 72 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)).
133. Id. at 67 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984)).
134. Id. at 73.
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whether specific personal jurisdiction existed. The supreme court ex-
plained that Parex Resources was not intending to operate in Texas or
benefit from the Texas economy, but was seeking Colombian assets.135
The fact that Nabors and ERG operated in Texas was not sufficient for
asserting specific personal jurisdiction.136 Even though Parex Resources
directed “voluminous” electronic communications to Nabors’ employees
located in Texas, those contacts were not purposeful availment of the
Texas forum, but were merely a coincidence of Nabors’ employees’
location.137
In contrast, in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. v. Nautic
Management VI, L.P., the Texas Supreme Court held that a Texas court
had specific personal jurisdiction over three private-equity funds and
their general partner, all of which were Delaware limited partnerships.138
Several executives from Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc.
(Cornerstone), a company that operates hospitals in Texas and various
other states, contacted the three private-equity funds about purchasing a
chain of Texas hospitals from Reliant Hospital Partners, LLC (Reli-
ant).139 After the deal was completed, the executives resigned their posi-
tions with Cornerstone and joined the new entity the private-equity funds
purchased, which had purchased the hospitals from Reliant.140 Corner-
stone then sued the executives, the private-equity funds, and their general
partner, alleging that the private-equity funds and their general partner
committed tortious interference and that they “conspired with and as-
sisted the executives in their tortious conduct.”141 The private-equity
funds and their general partner filed a special appearance.142 The trial
court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over the private-equity funds
but not the general partner, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed in
part and reversed in part, holding that the Texas court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over any of the four entities.143
The supreme court reversed, concluding that the trial court had specific
personal jurisdiction over the private-equity funds and their general part-
ner.144 The supreme court concluded that the funds and the general part-
ner established minimum contacts with Texas because they “targeted
Texas assets in which to invest and sought to profit from that invest-
ment.”145 Similarly, specific personal jurisdiction over the private-equity
funds and their general partner comported with traditional notions of fair
135. Id. at 74.
136. Id. at 73–74.
137. Id. at 74–76.
138. Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, L.P., 493 S.W.3d
65, 67 (Tex. 2016).
139. Id. at 67–68.
140. Id. at 69.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 70.
144. Id. at 74.
145. Id. at 73.
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play and substantial justice because any burden to them was outweighed
by Texas’s interest in a dispute alleging a “usurpation of a corporate op-
portunity in Texas involving Texas assets.”146
As Searcy and Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. demon-
strate, a Texas court is likely to have personal jurisdiction over a foreign
entity and its executives when the foreign entity is seeking to purchase
Texas assets and benefit from the Texas economy, but may not have per-
sonal jurisdiction when the foreign entity is seeking foreign assets and the
contacts with Texas are merely fortuitous.
B. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS IN CLOSELY HELD
COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS
In 2014, in Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court notably declined
to recognize a cause of action for “minority shareholder oppression” in a
closely held corporation, and in doing so, reversed the Dallas Court of
Appeals’ judgment that affirmed the jury’s finding of oppressive conduct
on the minority shareholder’s oppression claim.147 The supreme court,
however, remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether
the plaintiff minority shareholder could recover on her breach of fiduci-
ary claims against the directors of the closely held corporation.148 On re-
mand, the court of appeals determined that she could not because no
informal fiduciary relationship between the directors and minority share-
holder existed.149
The court of appeals explained that informal fiduciary relationships
only arise in a business transaction if a “special relationship of trust and
confidence existed prior to, and apart from, the transaction(s) at issue
. . . .”150 In other words, there must be proof that because of the special
relationship of trust and confidence the plaintiff “is in fact accustomed to
be guided by the judgment or advice” of the party owing the fiduciary
duty.151 In Ritchie, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate the ex-
istence of an informal fiduciary relationship.152 The family relationship
between the parties and the minority shareholder’s mere hope that one of
the directors would explain the operations of the business entity to her
were insufficient to create the informal fiduciary relationship.153
146. Id. at 74.
147. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 860, 891 (Tex. 2014).
148. Id. at 892.
149. Ritchie v. Rupe, No. 05-08-00615-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 276, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jan. 12, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The minority shareholder’s breach of
“fiduciary duty claim [was] not based on the formal fiduciary duties that officers and direc-
tors owe to the corporation,” but on an informal fiduciary duty they allegedly owed di-
rectly to the minority shareholder. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 891–92.
150. Ritchie, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 276, at *9 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v.
CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 288 (Tex. 1998)).
151. Id. at *11 (quoting Gregan v. Kelly, 355 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, no pet.)).
152. Id. at *2.
153. Id. at *13–14.
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Along the same lines, in Rainier Income Fund I, Ltd. v. Gans, the Dal-
las Court of Appeals determined that a president/owner of a general or
limited partner in a partnership does not owe a fiduciary duty to the other
limited partners in the partnership.154 In that case, the parties formed two
partnerships, R–75 L.P. and R–75 II L.P., for the purpose of developing
and leasing two commercial properties in Allen, Texas.155 Star Creek
Construction GP, Inc. was the general partner of both partnerships, and
FNS Holdings, L.P., Rainier Income Fund I, Ltd., and Rainier Income &
Growth Fund II, Ltd. were the limited partners.156 Gans was the presi-
dent of Star Creek Construction GP, Inc. and the co-owner of FNS Hold-
ings, L.P., and he signed personal guaranties in relation to both
projects.157 When “the project [was] not commercially successful” and
“Gans refused to pay” on the guaranties, the two Rainier Income Funds
(the limited partners) sued Gans for breach of the guaranty agreements
and breach of fiduciary duty.158 A special judge, appointed pursuant to
Chapter 151 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, determined
that Gans owed no fiduciary duty to either of the Rainier Income
Funds.159 The trial court adopted the special judge’s conclusion, and the
Rainier Income Funds appealed.160 The court of appeals determined that
Gans, as an officer of the general partner and as co-owner of one of the
limited partners, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the partnership; that
fiduciary duty was owed by the partners themselves (i.e., the general part-
ner, Star Creek Construction GP, Inc.).161
Importantly, the court of appeals explained that the plaintiffs did not
allege that the corporate identity of Star Creek Construction GP, Inc.
should have been disregarded or that there was an informal fiduciary re-
lationship between the Rainier Income Funds and Gans.162 Therefore,
because there was no fiduciary relationship, the Rainier Income Funds
could not prevail on their breach of fiduciary duty claim.163 The Ritchie
and Gans cases reinforce the principle that courts will closely analyze the
existence of formal and informal fiduciary duties owed directly to the
shareholders of corporations or partners of partnerships, as opposed to
the traditional fiduciary duties the directors and officers owe to the enti-
ties themselves.
154. Rainier Income Fund I, Ltd. v. Gans, 501 S.W.3d 617, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2016, pet. denied).




159. Id. at 620.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 624.
162. Id. The court of appeals also concluded that Gans’s obligation to pay under the
guaranties was contingent on certain events that did not occur, and thus held that the
Rainier Income Funds similarly take nothing on their breach of guaranty claim as well. Id.
at 624–26.
163. Id. at 624.
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C. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
PURSUANT TO STATUTES
It is a well-known principle of corporate law that corporate officers and
directors are shielded from personal liability for the entity’s contractual
obligations pursuant to the corporate shield.164 Section 171.255 of the
Texas Tax Code, however, makes corporate directors and officers person-
ally liable for business debts “created or incurred” after the entity fails to
pay its franchise tax if the corporate privileges of the entity are for-
feited.165 In Hovel v. Batzri, the First Houston Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a debt is created or incurred when the wrongful conduct
occurs, not when a judgment is ultimately entered.166
In Hovel, two homeowners contracted with a Texas limited liability
company to build a custom home.167 The limited liability company had a
single member and manager.168 When the homeowners became unhappy
with the final product, they sued the limited liability company for breach
of contract, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and statutory
fraud, amongst other claims.169 After plaintiffs filed suit, the limited lia-
bility company forfeited its corporate privileges when it did not pay the
franchise tax.170 While the corporate charter was forfeited, the homeown-
ers were awarded a default judgment against the limited liability com-
pany for over $2 million, after which the charter and corporate privileges
were reinstated.171 The homeowners then sued the member-manager di-
rectly, seeking to hold him personally liable for the judgment against the
limited liability company under Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code.172
The trial court granted summary judgment to the member-manager, con-
cluding that the default judgment did not create or incur the debt, which
was previously created when the underlying conduct occurred.173 The
homeowners appealed, arguing that the debt was not created or incurred
until it was liquidated by the default judgment, which occurred while the
limited liability company’s corporate charter was forfeited, and thus the
member-manager was individually liable.174
The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s summary
judgment. The court of appeals noted, “Although the statute imposes
civil liability, [it] operates as a penal statute,” and thus would be strictly
164. Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. 2006).
165. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (West 2015). The statute applies to limited
liability companies. See id. § 171.2515(b).
166. Hovel v. Batzri, 490 S.W.3d 132, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.
filed).






173. Id. at 135.
174. Id. at 136.
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construed.175 The court of appeals also relied on broad definitions of the
terms “created” and “incurred” previously articulated by the Texas Su-
preme Court.176 In Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., the
supreme court defined created as “[t]o bring into existence something
which did not exist,” and incurred as “[b]rought on, occasioned, or
caused,”177 and the supreme court concluded that debts are considered
created or incurred “at the time the relevant contractual obligations were
incurred.”178 With those principles in mind, the court of appeals held that
the debt was not created or incurred when the default judgment was en-
tered but was created or incurred pre-forfeiture.179 The court of appeals
explained that all of the wrongful conduct underlying the claims occurred
prior to the corporate charter being forfeited when “the parties estab-
lished their contractual and other obligations,” and that the only post-
forfeiture occurrence was the entry of the default judgment.180 Accord-
ingly, the member-manager was not individually liable for the $2 million
debt because the debt was created or incurred before the limited liability
company’s charter was forfeited.181
Similarly, in Morello v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a
statute in the Texas Water Code that authorizes the assessment of a civil
penalty on “[a] person who causes, suffers, allows, or permits a violation
of”182 certain sections of the Texas Water Code and other statutes does
not impose individual liability on a director or officer of a business entity,
absent the director or officer’s individual tortious or fraudulent con-
duct.183 In Morello, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(the Commission) issued a compliance plan on five surface-water im-
poundments situated on real property that had been used in the past as a
pipe-manufacturing facility.184 The original property owner declared
bankruptcy, and the property was purchased by a Texas limited liability
company at auction.185 Morello was the manager and operator of the lim-
ited liability company that purchased the real property.186 A couple of
years after the property was purchased, the State sued the limited liability
company on behalf of the Commission, alleging that the company did not
follow the compliance plan’s provisions, including, but not limited to, the
175. Id.
176. Id. at 138.
177. Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 198 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. 1946).
178. Id.; Hovel, 490 S.W.3d at 138 (quoting Schwab, 198 S.W.2d at 81). The court of
appeals explained that in 2008, the Texas Legislature repealed a narrow definition of
“debt” found within the Tax Code, and in doing so reaffirmed the relation-back doctrine
found in Schwab and other cases. Hovel, 490 S.W.3d at 142–44.
179. Hovel, 490 S.W.3d at 145.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.102 (West 2008).
183. Morello v. State, No. 03-15-00428-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 4800, at *24–26
(Tex. App.—Austin May 6, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
184. Id. at *2–3.
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id.at *5.
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company’s failure to provide financial assurance, prepare necessary re-
ports, and conduct groundwater testing.187 The State also sought to im-
pose civil penalties on Morello personally as a result of the statutory
violations.188 The trial court granted the State summary judgment against
Morello and ordered that he pay $367,250 pursuant to Section 7.102 of
the Texas Water Code.189
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Morello could not be indi-
vidually liable for the civil penalties unless the failure to comply with the
compliance plan was “tortious or fraudulent conduct of Morello individu-
ally.”190 The court of appeals began by explaining that it is a “bedrock
principle of corporate law”191 that individuals associated with the corpo-
rate entity are shielded from personal liability, except when “maintaining
the corporate shield would result in ‘“injustice” and “inequity[ ]”’
. . . .”192 In this case, however, the State did not allege that it was seeking
to pierce the limited liability company’s corporate veil to hold Morello
personally liable or that Morello used the limited liability company to
perpetuate a fraud or tort on the State for his own personal benefit.193
Instead, the State argued that Morello should be individually liable be-
cause when a statutory provision creates individual liability, as in this
case, a corporate officer may be held personally liable for the violations
when those violations are a result of “wrongful acts,” even if the wrongful
acts are performed as an agent of the corporation.194 The court of appeals
disagreed, and instead held that the case law does not support “the pro-
position that the legislature intended to allow for individual liability to be
imposed on an agent of a limited liability company even in the absence of
fraudulent or tortious conduct through the passage of the [civil penalties
sections] of the Water Code . . . .”195
Both the Hovel and Morello decisions illustrate examples of the courts
of appeals narrowly interpreting penal-like statutes that could be read to
impose direct liability on corporate directors and officers. In doing so, the
courts of appeals have re-affirmed the corporate shield and its protection
of directors and officers from individual liability, absent a showing neces-
sitating the piercing of the corporate veil.
D. STANDING OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF A LIMITED PARTNER
Finally, in Shurberg v. La Salle Industries Limited, a limited partner in a
limited partnership passed away and her husband, as sole heir and repre-
187. Id. at *5–6.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.
190. Id. at *26, *32.
191. Id. at *10–11 (quoting Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. 2006)).
192. Id. at *11 (quoting SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444,
455 (Tex. 2008)).
193. Id. at *16.
194. Id. at *17–21.
195. Id. at *25.
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sentative of the estate, sought to hold the limited partnership and remain-
ing partners liable under several causes of action.196 The husband sued
the limited partnership and other limited partners alleging breach of fidu-
ciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.
Further, he demanded an accounting, sought to have the general partner
removed, and requested that a receiver be appointed.197 The defendants
filed, and the trial court granted, pleas to the jurisdiction stating that the
representative lacked standing to assert derivative claims on behalf of the
limited partnership because the personal representative and estate were
not limited partners.198 Upon the trial court’s dismissal, the representa-
tive appealed.199
The San Antonio Court of Appeals first inquired into whether the per-
sonal representative was a limited partner. The court of appeals inter-
preted a section of the Texas Business and Organizations Code and
concluded that the statute’s plain meaning provides that “a legal repre-
sentative [of a limited partner] is not automatically transformed into a
limited partner, but may become one if the partnership agreement per-
mits it.”200 In this case, the partnership agreement provided that it was
binding on a successor or assignee, but it explicitly provided that an as-
signment does not make the assignee a limited partner.201 Therefore, the
representative was not a limited partner of the partnership.202 The court
of appeals then analyzed whether the representative’s claims were deriva-
tive or direct because Section 153.402 of the Texas Business Organiza-
tions Code requires a person bringing a derivative claim on behalf of a
limited partnership to be a limited partner when the action is com-
menced.203 The court of appeals had little problem determining that the
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and breach
of contract claims were derivative claims because they alleged wrongs to
the limited partnership.204 Moreover, the claims for removal of the gen-
eral partner, appointment of a receiver, and an accounting were also de-
196. Shurberg v. La Salle Indus., No. 04-15-00320-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2939, at
*4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
197. Id. at *5.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *6.
200. Id. at *11 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.113 (West 2012)). The full
section of the statute provides:
If a limited partner who is an individual dies or a court adjudges the limited
partner to be incapacitated in managing the limited partner’s person or prop-
erty, the limited partner’s executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or
other legal representative may exercise all of the limited partner’s rights and
powers to settle the limited partner’s estate or administer the limited part-
ner’s property, including the power of an assignee to become a limited part-
ner under the partnership agreement.
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.113.
201. Shurberg, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2939, at *11–13.
202. Id. at *16–17. The court of appeals also rejected the representative’s argument that
there was consent that he was a limited partner, finding no evidence of consent. Id. at
*15–16.
203. Id. at *17.
204. Id. at *19.
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rivative because they were based on and derived out of the
representative’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.205 Accordingly, the
representative did not have standing to pursue the derivative claims be-
cause he was not a limited partner, and the court of appeals affirmed the
grant of the pleas to the jurisdiction.206 Corporate officers and directors
should be sure to determine early on in a lawsuit whether a legal repre-
sentative of a former owner of the corporate entity has standing to pursue
claims alleging injury to the corporate entity (even if the claims are
wrongly characterized as direct claims).
205. Id. at *22–26. The representative also sought access to books and records, but the
court of appeals held that there was no justiciable controversy because the representative
was given the right to access the books and records through a stipulation. Id. at *20–22.
206. Id. at *26–27.
